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Trial Tactics

Voice Identification Experts
BY STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG

T

he problems associated with eyewitness
identification are well known. Examination
of cases in which defendants who had been
convicted but were later exonerated shows that mistaken eyewitness identification is one of the major
contributors to wrongful convictions. Courts struggle with what to do about eyewitness identifications
because prosecutions often cannot proceed without
witnesses testifying to what they believe they saw and
who they believe committed criminal acts. Should
they instruct jurors on the dangers of mistaken eyewitness identification? Should they admit expert
testimony on the dangers of mistaken eyewitness
testimony? Should they rely exclusively on crossexamination to challenge the reliability of expert
testimony? There is not yet a consensus on the best
approach, although there are positive developments
in certain police departments and prosecutor offices
with respect to how photo arrays should be shown
to witnesses. The issue does not go away, as illustrated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Perry v.
New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (holding that
due process does not require exclusion of suggestive
identifications where there is no law enforcement
responsibility for the suggestiveness).
An issue that is closely related to eyewitness testimony
is voice identification, which might be called “earwitness identification.” Should courts trust that jurors will
be able to evaluate the reliability of such identification
without some assistance from the judge or from expert
witnesses? That is a question that arose in United States
v. Schiro, 679 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2012).

The Schiro Facts

Five defendants were charged with a racketeering
(RICO) conspiracy as a result of their involvement
in the “Chicago Outfit,” which the court described
as a “long-running lineal descendant of Al Capone’s
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gang.” (Id. at 524.) The Outfit conducted its operations through a series of “street crews.” Two of the
five defendants had been charged with and convicted
of RICO conspiracy arising from their involvement
with street crews. They argued unsuccessfully that
they were placed in double jeopardy when they were
charged with a RICO conspiracy for involvement in
the Outfit given that the criminal activities of the Outfit and the crews were one and the same. The court
concluded that while the street crews were operating
divisions of the Outfit, the Outfit had powers and
responsibilities that the crews did not have.
James Marcello, one of the defendants who
lost his double jeopardy claim, raised an objection
at trial and argued on appeal that the trial judge
abused discretion in excluding expert testimony
on the issue of voice identification. The majority
described the evidence issue as follows:
Marcello raises an evidentiary issue. A victim’s
daughter identified Marcello’s voice as that of
the man who called her father on the day of
the father’s disappearance. Marcello wanted
to present an expert witness who would testify
that voice identifications are often mistaken.
The judge excluded the evidence. He was skeptical about its empirical basis and also thought
that the jury already had a good understanding
of the fallibility of “earwitness” identification.
We do not suggest that such expert evidence is
worthless or that jurors always grasp the risk
of misidentification inherent in eyewitness and
earwitness testimony. But a trial judge has a
responsibility to screen expert evidence for
reliability and to determine the total effects of
proposed evidence, weighing its probative value
against its potential to (among other things)
confuse the jury. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Both
reliability and potential for confusion were factors in this case and we cannot say the judge
abused his discretion in refusing to admit the
expert evidence, which the jury might have
taken as a signal that it should disregard the
witness’s identification testimony. See United
States v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir.
2009). If jurors are told merely that voice identifications frequently are mistaken, what are they
to do with this information? The defendant’s
lawyer will argue mistaken identification and
jurors told that such mistakes are common may
be afraid to make their own judgment.
(Schiro, 679 F.3d at 529.)
A dissenting judge disagreed with the majority on
the double jeopardy issue and had a very different
take on the voice identification issue. She argued that
Marcello’s proposed expert testimony would have
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done much more than simply tell the jury that voice
identifications are often mistaken, and she described
the background and the importance of the voice
identification in more detail than did the majority.
Marcello was accused of murdering Michael
Spilotro. Spilotro’s daughter, Michelle, testified that on the day of her father’s murder, a
man called their home and asked to speak to
him. She testified that the same person had
regularly called her father. Three years after
Spilotro’s death, Michelle listened to a “voice
lineup” put together by the FBI. The first
five voices on the tape were those of officers
reading a sample piece of text; the last was
Marcello’s. Michelle picked Marcello’s voice
as the one she remembered hearing on the day
of her father’s death. At trial, she told the jury
that she was “100 percent sure” it was Marcello’s voice she had heard on the phone.
(Id. at 542 (Wood, J., dissenting).)

The Expert Testimony

Marcello sought to rely on Daniel Yarmey, a professor of psychology who had conducted extensive
research on memory and who had paid particular attention to voice identification. The proposed
expert testimony had two parts: it would have
explained the reliability problems with voice identification, and it would have addressed specific issues
relating to the FBI voice lineup.
Yarmey did not simply offer an opinion that voice
identifications were often unreliable; he intended to
point to specific studies in which misidentification
rates were as high as 45 percent, and he was prepared to discuss the factors that affect the reliability
of voice lineups. In addition, Yarmey was prepared to
describe an empirical analysis of the FBI voice lineup
that he conducted. In his experiment, he recruited
157 undergraduates at his university to listen to the
lineup and to try to identify the suspect’s voice using
a number of factors. The students identified Marcello
at a rate that exceeded pure chance. This suggested
that the “samples” used by the FBI were not a neutral or reliable test of the daughter’s ability to identify
Marcello’s voice, because students were identifying it
more often than chance would predict even though
they had no experience with the voice.
The trial judge excluded the proposed testimony,
but not because of a concern about Yarmey’s qualifications or the reliability of his testimony. Instead,
the judge concluded that it was not necessary to assist
the jury because the judge examined the voice lineup
and found that there was “nothing about the difference [between Marcello’s voice and the others] that
would suggest to a hearer, to a listener, that one or the
other was actually the suspect.” (Id. at 543 (alteration

in original).) Apparently, the judge thought the jury
could make the same analysis without expert help.

The Dissent’s Concern

The dissent was concerned about eyewitness testimony generally and the mounting evidence of its
contribution toward erroneous convictions:
Even though our review of a district court’s
decision not to admit expert testimony is deferential, see United States v. Carter, 410 F.3d
942, 950 (7th Cir. 2005), in my view the district
court’s refusal to admit Dr. Yarmey’s testimony was a mistake. In recent years, courts
have become more aware of the reality that
human memory is not necessarily reliable. A
study of 200 wrongful convictions revealed
that 79% rested in part on mistaken eyewitness
identifications. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging
Innocence, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 60 (2008).
This does not mean that courts must impose
a blanket ban on such testimony, but it is critical to be cautious. We cannot ignore the power
that a witness’s claim to be “100% sure” may
have on a jury, nor can we ignore that such witnesses are sometimes, unfortunately, mistaken.
The Supreme Court recently emphasized that
one tool that courts can use to ensure juries
do not give such testimony more weight than
it is worth is to allow “expert testimony on the
hazards of eyewitness identification.” Perry v.
New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 729, 181 L.
Ed. 2d 694 (2012). As Dr. Yarmey’s research
shows, a witness’s voice memory is not exempt
from the sort of problems that we more commonly associate with a witness’s vision; just
as with eyewitness identification, expert testimony on the reliability of voice identification
reveals vulnerabilities that lie outside the range
of common knowledge.
(Schiro, 679 F.3d at 543.)
The dissent cited a prior decision in which the
court suggested that trial judges should not exclude
expert testimony simply because jurors may appreciate that eyewitness testimony is fallible.
As we explained in United States v. Bartlett,
expert testimony should not be kept out simply because a court believes “jurors know
from their daily lives that memory is fallible.” 567 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2009). That
may be true, but “[t]he question that social
science can address is how fallible,” id., and
thus how deeply the jury might wish to discount any given identification. “That jurors
have beliefs about this does not make expert
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evidence irrelevant; to the contrary, it may
make such evidence vital, for if jurors’ beliefs
are mistaken then they may reach incorrect
conclusions. Expert evidence can help jurors
evaluate whether their beliefs about the reliability of eyewitness testimony are correct.” Id.
(Schiro, 679 F.3d at 543.)
Finally, the dissent pointed out that the trial judge’s
opinion was inconsistent with the experiment that Dr.
Yarmey conducted, which suggested that the judge
might have been wrong and that jurors might similarly fail to appreciate problems with the voice lineup.
As is clear from the district court’s remarks
in this case, the court itself held beliefs about
the reliability and suggestiveness of the voice
lineup that are belied by the expert’s conclusions. As far as we know, the jurors shared
these misconceptions. This case thus highlights
why it is critical for jurors to hear expert testimony in order to be able correctly to evaluate
a witness’s memory. Just because courts have
routinely admitted laywitness identification in
the past is no reason to continue to do so without skepticism, in light of modern research
showing the fallibility of such identifications.
When a court does admit such identification
testimony, expert testimony will often be necessary to enable jurors to properly evaluate
its reliability.
(Id. at 543–44.)

Lessons

Given the evidence that mistaken identification testimony has contributed to wrongful convictions, there
is good reason for courts to seek ways to reduce the
likelihood that jurors will treat such testimony as
infallible and focus on the factors that tend to increase
or decrease reliability. One way is to admit expert
testimony that can educate jurors on these factors.
There also is some reason to believe that jurors
may be uncertain as to whether voice identification
is more reliable, less reliable, or similar in reliability
to visual identification. Each reader can ask himself
or herself this question: what do I know about the
relative accuracy of ear and eye identifications? If
the answer is “nothing,” that answer would suggest
the usefulness of expert testimony when any form
of identification evidence is proffered.
But, the case for admitting some expert testimony
does not necessarily mean that all such testimony
should be admitted. There is a good argument in
favor of testimony that does not purport to tell
jurors how reliable particular testimony is and that
focuses on factors that should usually be considered
in assessing eyewitness accounts.

One part of Yarmey’s testimony fits this description. But what about the experiment? The dissenting
judge appeared to argue that the fact that the judge
reached a different conclusion about the reliability
of the voice lineup demonstrated the need for the
jury to hear about the experiment. This argument
failed to address, however, seven crucial words that
the dissent used to describe the experiment in which
the students listened to the FBI voice lineup: the
students were asked to “evaluate it using a number
of factors.” What were those factors? The choice
of factors identified for the students might have
explained their more than random selection of Marcello’s voice. Presumably, the daughter who made
the identification was not given factors to consider.
The question, then, is whether choice of factors can
itself influence an identification.
Moreover, the daughter testified that she had
heard the same voice on a number of prior occasions. Does the research indicate whether and to
what extent repeated exposure to an individual or
a voice may increase the ability to make an accurate
identification? If so, would it be important to bring
this information to the jury? If not, is there a danger that general testimony about identifications may
fail to focus on an important factor?
These are questions that will be asked as identifications are challenged and expert testimony is
offered. There should be no doubt that there is a
place for expert testimony about identifications.
Yarmey’s testimony may serve as a reminder that a
trial judge need not decide that proffered testimony
must be either admitted or excluded in its entirety. A
judge may decide that some portions of testimony
provide useful background for jurors to consider
while other portions raise questions about reliability.
Looking back at Yarmey’s testimony, it seems clear
that the majority may have exaggerated when it said
that if the judge had admitted the testimony, “the
jury might have taken [this] as a signal that it should
disregard the witness’s identification testimony.” (Id.
at 529 (majority opinion).) In fact, had the testimony
been admitted, the jurors might have understood that
Yarmey was simply educating the jurors on the fact
that sometimes witnesses are wrong and that some
identifications are more suggestive than jurors might
realize. The jurors would have still been aware that
the daughter had heard the voice on previous occasions. The answer to the majority’s question, which
was “[i]f jurors are told merely that voice identifications frequently are mistaken, what are they to do
with this information?” (id.), is that jurors should not
simply be told that voice identifications frequently are
mistaken; instead they should be educated as to factors that promote or detract from accuracy, and they
should carefully examine identification testimony.
That does not seem like a bad thing. n
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